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OPTIMAL TAXATION AND SOCIAL INSURANCE
IN A LIFETIME PERSPECTIVE
A. Lans Bovenberg and Peter Birch Sørensen
1. Introduction
Much of the inequality in the distribution of annual incomes stems from people having
diﬀerent earnings capacities in various stages of the life cycle. Hence, in the presence of
well-functioning capital markets enabling consumers to smooth consumption over the life
cycle, redistributive taxes and transfers should address inequalities in the distribution
of lifetime incomes. Yet, in practice, taxes and transfers are mostly conditioned on
annual income, with little or no regard to a person’s longer-run earnings capacity. The
explanation is mainly administrative because governments rarely keep systematic records
of the earnings histories of their citizens. Moreover, since a person’s lifetime labor earnings
are not fully known until the time he or she retires, the authorities cannot base taxes
and transfers on lifetime income. However, it is possible to condition public retirement
benefits on a person’s previous earnings. The eﬀective marginal and average tax rate
on income earned earlier in life thus becomes dependent on earnings in other periods
of life. In fact, retirement benefits in many countries do to some extent depend on
previous earnings. Moreover, with modern information and communication technologies,
information on individual earnings histories becomes much easier to gather and store. The
question whether an optimal tax-transfer system should exploit information on lifetime
earnings therefore becomes relevant.
This paper addresses this issue. In particular, we study whether social insurance
benefits aimed at compensating for a loss of earnings capacity should depend on previ-
ous labor income. Although for the sake of concreteness we label the shock to earnings
capacity as disability, our analysis applies also to other types of idiosyncratic shocks to
human capital. In our model, people participate in the labor market for two periods, but
some people become disabled in the second period. The government wants to redistribute
income for two reasons: first, to reduce inequalities stemming from exogenous diﬀerences
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in productivities at the beginning of the working life and, second, to compensate un-
lucky individuals who become disabled during their career. In the late stage of life, able
individuals receive an ordinary retirement benefit, while the disabled collect a special
disability benefit. Both types of benefits may be conditioned on previous earnings.
We show that the optimal disability benefit should increase more strongly with previ-
ous income than the ordinary retirement benefit. In this way, the government can provide
disability insurance to not only the low-skilled but also to the high-skilled, while at the
same time improving the first-period labor-supply incentives of the high-skilled. By thus
basing second-period transfers on first-period earnings, the optimal tax-transfer system
involves lifetime taxation rather than annual taxation. In the presence of distortionary
labor taxes aimed at redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled, optimal dis-
ability insurance is only imperfect. The reason is that imperfect disability insurance
encourages young workers to increase their first-period earnings by working harder. By
raising their labor supply, workers can improve their insurance against disability because
the disability benefit increases more strongly with previous income than the ordinary
retirement benefit collected by able workers. Our analysis thus shows that full disability
insurance is not optimal. Thus, even though the private market could implement full
disability insurance (since moral hazard is absent in our model), this would not be op-
timal because private insurers would fail to internalize the external eﬀects of additional
disability insurance on the base of the redistributive labor tax. The government thus
faces an incentive to prevent private insurance companies from fully insuring disability.
Indeed, a mix of a public tax-transfer system oﬀering less than full insurance and self
insurance through precautionary saving is optimal.
The optimal tax literature has considered linear as well as non-linear tax systems.
Real-world tax systems are typically piece-wise linear. In fact, recent decades have wit-
nessed a trend towards more linearity, as governments have flattened their tax schedules
and reduced the number of income brackets to simplify the tax system. Against this
background, we consider a linear tax-transfer system with a constant marginal tax rate.
However, by tying social insurance benefits to previous earnings, the policy maker in
our model can diﬀerentiate the eﬀective marginal tax rate on labor income according
to lifetime earnings capacity. Our analysis shows that it is indeed optimal to exploit
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opportunities for such diﬀerentiation.
The literature on lifetime income taxation is quite sparse. Vickrey (1939, 1947) made
early contributions to the normative theory of lifetime income taxation. He was concerned
about the overtaxation of fluctuating as opposed to stable incomes under a progressive
annual income tax with a marginal tax rate that rises with the level of income. Vickrey
therefore proposed an income-averaging scheme in which annual income taxes are in fact
collected as a form of withholding for lifetime income tax calculations that are completed
only upon death.
Diamond (2003, ch. 3 and 4) analyzes lifetime income taxation in a two-period setting,
but without allowing for early retirement due to disability. He finds that the optimal non-
linear lifetime income tax tends to imply greater equality of consumption levels among
retirees than among workers, assuming that the elderly tend to be more risk averse
than younger people. Intuitively, when the marginal utility of consumption declines
faster for the elderly, the social planner is more eager to avoid inequality of consumption
opportunities among the elderly than among younger people.
A paper more closely related to the present one is that of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978), who analyze optimal social insurance in a two-period model in which agents can
choose their retirement age endogenously, but may also be forced to retire early due to
an exogenous risk of disability. One of the results derived by Diamond and Mirrlees is
that agents who suﬀer disability early in life should receive a larger net transfer from
the government than those able to work until later in life. The optimal social insurance
scheme subsidizes those who retire early, although only to the extent compatible with
maintaining incentives to work. This result is consistent with the analysis in the present
paper. In some respects, the model of Diamond and Mirrlees (op.cit.) is more general
than the one presented here, since they allow for a fully non-linear tax scheme (including
a capital income tax). However, whereas Diamond and Mirrlees assume that all able
workers feature the same productivity, we allow for diﬀerent skill levels. In our model,
the government thus employs its redistributive policy instruments to ’insure’ against
not only skill heterogeneity but also disability risk. We thus integrate the conventional
analysis of optimal redistributive taxation with the analysis of optimal social insurance.
Moreover, by employing Epstein-Zin preferences (see Epstein and Zin (1989)), we are
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able to provide a detailed characterization of the optimal tax and subsidy rates.
Recent contributions to the literature on social insurance based on mandatory indi-
vidual savings accounts also consider redistribution policy in a lifetime perspective (see,
e.g., Fölster (1997, 1999), Orszag and Snower (1997), Feldstein and Altman (1998), Föl-
ster et al. (2002), Stiglitz and Yun (2002), Sørensen (2003) and Bovenberg and Sørensen
(2004)). These papers analyze policy schemes in which workers must contribute a fraction
of their earnings to an individual savings account that is debited when the owner draws
certain social insurance benefits. At the time of retirement, any surplus on the account
is converted into an annuity and added to the ordinary public retirement benefit. If the
account is negative, the owner is still guaranteed a minimum public pension. Bovenberg
and Sørensen (op.cit.) show that the introduction of such a system as a supplement to
the conventional tax-transfer system improves the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ by reducing
the distortionary impact of those taxes and transfers that mainly serve to redistribute
income over the individual’s own lifecycle.
Mandatory individual savings accounts for social insurance introduce an element of
lifetime income taxation by eﬀectively conditioning retirement benefits on the individual’s
prior labor market performance. Intertemporally optimizing agents who are able to
accumulate a surplus on their account at the time of retirement face reduced marginal
tax rates on labor eﬀort. Individuals who end up with a surplus on their accounts —
and who will therefore face stronger incentives to supply labor — tend to be concentrated
in the low-risk segments of the working population. This is in contrast to the optimal
tax-transfer system in the economy modelled here, where people who end up with a
relatively low lifetime income due to disability actually face a lower marginal eﬀective tax
rate on labor income earned early in life. The contradiction is only superficial, however.
The system of mandatory savings accounts is designed for social insurance benefits that
involve a significant risk of moral hazard and relatively little redistribution from high to
low lifetime incomes (as opposed to redistribution over the lifecycle). The present paper,
however, focuses on optimal redistribution of lifetime incomes in a setting with exogenous
idiosyncratic shocks to human capital. In any case, the individual accounts considered
by Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) and the social insurance scheme analyzed here are
based on the same fundamental principle: net benefits received at a later stage in life
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vary positively with labor income earned earlier in life so as to reduce the distortions to
labor supply caused by a redistributive tax-transfer system.
2. The model
Individuals live for two periods. Everybody is able to work in the first period, but in
the second period individuals face the risk of becoming disabled. Disabled individuals
must finance their consumption by saving undertaken in the first period and by a public
transfer that may be conditioned on their previous earnings. Able individuals work during
(part of) the second period. The leisure consumed by able workers in period 2 may be
interpreted as time voluntarily spent in retirement. Larger second-period labor supply
can thus be viewed as a higher retirement age. The government transfer collected by able
workers in the second period corresponds to an ordinary retirement benefit. Also this
benefit may be conditioned on previous earnings, and it may be diﬀerentiated from the
disability benefit. We distinguish two skill groups (the low-skilled and the high-skilled)
earning diﬀerent real wage rates reflecting exogenous diﬀerences in labor productivity.
Also the real interest rate is exogenous. Indeed, our economy can be viewed as a small
open economy with perfect capital mobility.
2.1. Individual behavior
This section describes the behavior of a low-skilled worker; the behavior of the high-
skilled is given by fully analogous relationships. A low-skilled worker’s labor supply in
the first period is c1, and his consumption during that period is C1c. If he is able to work
in the second period, he supplies labor c2 and consumes an amount Ca2c. If he becomes
disabled in period 2, his consumption is Cd2c. His expected lifetime utility U is given by
the nested utility function
U = U1 (C1c − g (c1)) + δf (E [U2]) , U 01 > 0, U 001 < 0, f 0 > 0, (2.1)
E [U2] = pu
¡
Cd2c
¢
+ (1− p)u (Ca2c − h (c2)) , 0 < p < 1,
g0 > 0, g00 > 0, h0 > 0, h00 > 0,
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where U1 (·) denotes utility during the first period of life, δ a discount factor, E [U2]
expected utility during the second period, and p the probability of becoming disabled
in the second period. Utility during the first period depends on first-period consump-
tion, adjusted for the disutility of first-period work eﬀort, g (c1). Similarly, for an able
worker, the second-period utility u (Ca2 − h (c2)) depends on his consumption corrected
for the disutility of his second-period labor supply, h (c2) . A disabled worker obtains
utility u
¡
Cd2
¢
. The specification in (2.1) is suﬃciently flexible to allow the degree of in-
tertemporal substitutability in consumption to deviate from the reciprocal of the degree
of relative risk aversion, as suggested by Epstein and Zin (1989). For later purposes, we
define
U 0dc ≡
1
δ
1
p
∂U
∂Cd2c
= f 0
¡
pu
¡
Cd2c
¢
+ (1− p)u (Ca2c − h (c2))
¢ · u0 ¡Cd2c¢ > 0, (2.2)
U 0ac ≡
1
δ
1
(1− p)
∂U
∂Ca2c
= f 0
¡
pu
¡
Cd2c
¢
+ (1− p)u (Ca2c − h (c2))
¢ · u0 (Ca2c − h (c2)) > 0.
(2.3)
U 00dc ≡
1
p
∂U 0dc
∂Cd2c
= f 00 · £u0 ¡Cd2c¢¤2 + f 0 · u00 ¡Cd2c¢p , (2.4)
U 00ac ≡
1
1− p
∂U 0ac
∂Ca2c
= f 00 · [u0 (Ca2c − h (c2))]2 +
f 0 · u00 (Ca2c − h (c2))
1− p , (2.5)
U 00dac ≡
1
p
∂U 0ac
∂Cd2c
=
1
1− p
∂U 0dc
∂Ca2c
= f 00 · u0 ¡Cd2c¢ · u0 (Ca2c − h (c2)) . (2.6)
In the special case in which the reciprocal of the intertemporal substitution elasticity
coincides with the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, f 00 = 0 so that the (ex ante) mar-
ginal utility of disabled consumption does not depend on able consumption (i.e. U 00dac = 0).
f 00 is positive (negative) if the degree of risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the in-
verse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity so that the marginal utility of disabled
consumption rises (falls) with able consumption.
During the first period, the consumer’s budget constraint amounts to
C1c = w (1− t) c1 +G− Sc, (2.7)
where w represents the real wage rate of a low-skilled worker, t the constant marginal tax
rate on labor income, G a lump-sum transfer, and Sc saving of the low-skilled worker. In
the second period, an able worker receives a benefit consisting of a lump-sum component
B plus a component amounting to a fraction sa of his earnings during the first period.
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With r denoting the real interest rate, an able worker therefore faces the following second-
period budget constraint:
Ca2c = (1 + r)S
c + w (1− t) c2 +B + sawc1. (2.8)
A disabled worker receives a benefit equal to the constant b plus a fraction sd of his
previous labor income, so his second-period budget constraint is:
Cd2c = (1 + r)S
c + b+ sdwc1. (2.9)
The consumer maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.7) through (2.9). Optimal second-period
labor supply implies that the marginal disutility of work equals the marginal after-tax
real wage:
h0 (c2) = w (1− t) . (2.10)
The first-order condition for optimal saving is given by
δ(1 + r)
h
pU
0
dc + (1− p)U
0
ac
i
− U 01c = 0, (2.11)
where U
0
1c represents the marginal utility of first-period consumption of the low-skilled
worker. U
0
dc and U
0
ac are defined in (2.2) and (2.3), respectively.
The first-order condition for optimal first-period labor supply amounts to
[w(1− t)− g0(c1)]U
0
1c + δw
h
psdU
0
dc + (1− p)saU
0
ac
i
= 0. (2.12)
Part of the benefit of first-period labor supply accrues in the second period if disability
and retirement benefits rise with earnings (i.e. sa, sd > 0). Substituting (2.11) into (2.12)
to eliminate U
0
1c, we can write (2.12) as
w(1− tˆ1c) = g0(c1), (2.13)
where
tˆ1c = t−
µ
pˆcsd + (1− pˆc)sa
1 + r
¶
, (2.14)
with
pˆc =
pU
0
dc
pU 0dc + (1− p)U
0
ac
. (2.15)
The variable pˆc can be viewed as the risk-neutral probability of becoming disabled
for the low-skilled worker, so that tˆ1c may be interpreted as a risk-adjusted (certainty-
equivalent) marginal eﬀective tax rate on first-period labor income for the low-skilled
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worker. The risk-neutral probabilities diﬀer from real-world probabilities if agents are
risk-averse and not perfectly insured (so that U
0
dc 6= U 0ac). If, for example, sd > sa and
U
0
dc > U
0
ac, the individual can enhance the insurance against disability risk by raising first-
period labor supply. Ex post, the eﬀective marginal tax rate on first-period income for a
disabled worker
³
t− sd
1+r
´
then diﬀers from the corresponding eﬀective marginal tax rate
for an able worker
¡
t− sa
1+r
¢
. By diﬀerentiating sd from sa, the government thus makes
the marginal tax rate on first-period income depend on second-period income. In other
words, marginal and average tax rates depend on lifetime earnings. A key issue addressed
in this paper is whether such lifetime income taxation
¡
sd 6= sa¢ is in fact optimal and if
so, which factors determine the optimal gap between sd and sa.
For welfare analysis, we employ the consumer’s indirect lifetime utility function, which
exhibits the form
V c = V c
¡
G, b,B, t, sd, sa
¢
, (2.16)
with the derivatives (denoted by subscripts and found by applying the Envelope Theo-
rem):
V cG = U
0
1c, V
c
b = δpU
0
dc, V
c
B = δ (1− p)U 0ac, (2.17)
V ct = −wc1U 01c − δwc2 (1− p)U 0ac, V csd = δpwc1U 0dc, V csa = δ (1− p)wc1U 0ac. (2.18)
2.2. The government
Setting aside issues of intergenerational redistribution, we assume that the present value
of the taxes levied on each generation equals the present value of transfers paid to that
generation. This implies that the generational account of each cohort is zero. The high-
skilled are paid the wage rateW > w, and a high-skilled worker’s labor supply is denoted
by L. The exogenous fraction of low-skilled individuals in each cohort is α. Both skill
types face the same probability p of disability in the second period of life. Normalizing
the size of the cohort to unity, and using subscripts to indicate time periods, we can write
the constraint that a cohort’s generational account must be zero as
α
generational account of a low-skilled workerz }| {∙
twc1 +
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
(twc2 −B − sawc1)−
µ
p
1 + r
¶¡
b+ sdwc1
¢
−G
¸
+
9
(1− α)
generational account of a high-skilled workerz }| {∙
tWL1 +
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
(tWL2 −B − saWL1)−
µ
p
1 + r
¶¡
b+ sdWL1
¢
−G
¸
= 0.
(2.19)
Assuming that disability cannot be verified, the government also faces the incentive
compatibility constraint that an able worker should have no incentive to mimic a disabled
worker. In other words, the second-period utility of a mimicker should be no higher than
the second-period utility of a non-mimicker.1 For low-skilled workers, the resulting non-
mimicking constraint is given by
u
¡
(1 + r)Sc + wc2 (1− t) +B + sawc1 − h (c2)
¢
≥ u
¡
(1 + r)Sc + b+ sdwc1
¢
⇐⇒
Zc ≡ wc2 (1− t)− h (c2) +B − b+
¡
sa − sd
¢
wc1 ≥ 0, (2.20)
and for high-skilled workers the analogous constraint amounts to
Zh ≡WL2 (1− t)− h (L2) +B − b+
¡
sa − sd
¢
WL1 ≥ 0. (2.21)
The government maximizes the utilitarian sum of expected lifetime utilities. With V c
and V h indicating the utility of a low-skilled and that of a high-skilled worker, respectively,
we write the utilitarian social welfare function (SWF ) as
SWF = αV c
¡
G, b,B, t, sd, sa
¢
+ (1− α)V h
¡
G, b,B, t, sd, sa
¢
, (2.22)
which must be maximized with respect to the policy instruments G, b,B, t, sd, sa, subject
to the constraints (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21).
3. Optimal taxation and social insurance
3.1. The optimality of social insurance through lifetime income taxation
The first-order conditions for the solution to the policy problem stated in the previous
section are given in section A.3 of the appendix. Before exploring the implications of these
optimality conditions, we demonstrate that a lifetime income tax, rather than an annual
income tax, is optimal. In particular, the government can generate a Pareto improvement
1Sub-section 3.4 shows that the non-mimicking constraint is typically met in the optimum.
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by moving from a conventional tax-transfer system based on annual incomes only (i.e.
sd = sa) towards lifetime income taxation with sd > sa. Indeed, with sd > sa, the ex-
post eﬀective marginal tax rate on first-period labor income depends on lifetime earnings
capacity. Moreover, second-period transfers are based not only on the earnings in that
period, but also on the earnings in the first period. Hence, the government implements
lifetime income taxation.
To prove these results, we start out from a situation with annual income taxation
(s = sd = sa), where the government has optimized the other policy instruments in a
manner respecting the non-mimicking constraints (2.20) and (2.21). With annual income
taxation, it is optimal to increase b and to reduce B in a balanced-budget manner such
that the non-mimicking constraint for the low-skilled worker becomes binding. The reason
is that enhancing disability insurance in this way does not aﬀect labor-supply incentives
if sa = sd (since (A.12) and (A.13) in the appendix imply that labor supply does not
respond to b and B with annual income taxation). In the absence of a trade-oﬀ between
incentives and insurance, full disability insurance for the low-skilled is optimal. With
sd = sa, only the low-skilled can be fully insured against disability (i.e. Zc ≥ 0 implies
Zh > 0 (and hence U 0dh − U 0ah > 0), since WL2 (1− t) − h (L2) > wc2 (1− t) − h (c2)).2
Intuitively, compared to the low-skilled, the high-skilled lose more earnings in case of
disability, but receive the same compensation b−B if sd = sa.
Starting from an equilibrium with annual taxation, we consider a policy experiment
involving an increase in sd and a decrease in sa calibrated so as to keep the average
subsidy rate es ≡ psd + (1− p) sa constant, that is, a policy change satisfying
des = 0 =⇒ dsa = −µ p
1− p
¶
dsd, dsd > 0. (3.1)
At the same time, the government adjusts the policy instrument b to satisfy the binding
non-mimicking constraint (2.20). Recalling that sd = sa initially, and using (3.1) to
eliminate dsa, this requires
−db− wc1
¡
dsd − dsa
¢
= 0 =⇒ db = −
µ
wc1
1− p
¶
dsd. (3.2)
Finally, G is adjusted to keep the utility of the low-skilled agents constant, given the
policy changes specified in (3.1) and (3.2). Using the expressions for V cG and V
c
b given in
2The Envelope Theorem implies that the surpluses WL2 (1− t)− h (L2) and wc2 (1− t)− h (c2) are
increasing in the pre-tax wage rate. W > w thus implies thatWL2 (1− t)−h (L2) > wc2 (1− t)−h (c2).
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(2.17), and noting from (2.11) that full insurance implies that U 0dc = U
0
ac = U
0
1c/δ (1 + r),
we find that the required change in G is
dG = − p
1 + r
db. (3.3)
Using (2.19), one can easily show that the policy changes described by (3.1) through
(3.3) have no direct impact on net government revenue so that the revenue eﬀect of the
policy reform depends only on labor supply responses. With a binding non-mimicking
constraint (2.20) (and thus full disability insurance of the low-skilled (i.e. U 0dc = U
0
ac)),
(2.14) implies that the changes in sd and sa satisfying (3.1) will not aﬀect the eﬀective
tax rate bt1c and hence will not aﬀect c1, according to (2.13). Furthermore, since t is
unchanged, it follows from (2.10) that also c2 and L2 are constant, while (A.12) and
(A.14) in the appendix imply that ∂L1∂b =
∂L1
∂G = 0 when s
d = sa. According to (A.6) and
(A.7) in the appendix, the changes in sd and sa will aﬀect the first-period labor supply
of high-skilled workers in the following manner:
∂L1
∂sd
= −
µ bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
,
∂L1
∂sa
= −
µ
1− bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
, (3.4)
where ∂L
c
1
∂t < 0 is the compensated response of first-period high-skilled labor supply to
a change in the ordinary tax rate t. Using (3.1), (2.11), and (2.15), and recalling that
U 0dh − U 0ah > 0, we can write the (uncompensated) labor-supply response as
dL1 =
∙
∂L1
∂sd
+
∂L1
∂sa
dsa
dsd
¸
dsd = pδ
∙µ
−∂L
c
1
∂t
¶µ
U 0dh − U 0ah
U 01h
¶¸
dsd > 0. (3.5)
Thus, high-skilled labor supply expands. Intuitively, when disability insurance is linked
more closely to first-period labor eﬀort, high-skilled workers can enhance their disability
insurance by working harder. The improved labor-supply incentives benefit the govern-
ment budget as long as t1 = t− s1+r > 0.
At the same time, the changes in b, G, sa, and sd increase the lifetime utility of
high-skilled workers, since it follows from (2.17), (2.18) and (3.1) through (3.3) that3
dV h = pδ(WL1 − wc1) (U 0dh − U 0ah) dsd > 0. (3.6)
We conclude that moving from annual to lifetime taxation in this way enhances both
labor-market incentives and disability insurance for the high-skilled. Lifetime taxation
3We use the fact that the derivatives of the indirect utility function of the high-skilled are given by
expressions analogous to (2.17) and (2.18).
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thus improves the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives. Even without redistributive
motives (i.e. t1 = 0), lifetime income taxation dominates annual taxation because of
the possibility to oﬀer better disability insurance for the high-skilled without violating
the non-mimicking constraint for the low-skilled. These arguments are strengthened if
redistributive taxation distorts labor supply. In that case, lifetime taxation not only
improves disability insurance, but also alleviates the labor-market distortions imposed
by redistributive taxation.
3.2. The suboptimality of full insurance
We now proceed to show that full disability insurance of both skill groups can never be
optimal, even though separate linear tax schedules for the high-skilled and the low-skilled
allow for full insurance. To prove this result, we show that starting from an equilibrium
with full insurance of both skill groups, we can design a policy reform that leaves the
utility levels of both groups unaﬀected, while at the same time raising public revenue.
We start by noting that if both skill groups are fully insured (so that the non-
mimicking constraints are both met with equality), we may add (2.20) and (2.21) to
obtain
(WL2 − wc2)(1− t)− [h(L2)− h(c2)] = (sd − sa)(WL1 − wc1). (3.7)
Since the left-hand side is positive (see footnote 2), and first-period skilled earnings
exceed the corresponding unskilled earnings (i.e. WL1 > wc1), this expression implies
that sd > sa. Intuitively, compared to the low-skilled, high-skilled households face a larger
income loss if they become disabled. Hence, if low-skilled agents are fully insured against
disability risk, the disability benefit must rise more with earnings than the retirement
benefit does, so as to ensure that also the high-skilled agents are not hurt should they
become disabled.
We now make disability insurance less than perfect by reducing b and increasing G.
We reduce disability insurance in such a way that the lifetime utility of both households
remains constant. Using the expressions for V cG and V
c
b given in (2.17), along with the
analogous expressions for the high-skilled group, and noting from (2.11) that full insur-
ance (i.e., U 0d = U
0
a) implies that U
0
d = U
0
1/δ (1 + r) for both skill groups, we find that
such a policy reform must satisfy expression (3.3). From the government’s perspective,
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the eﬀective marginal tax rate on first-period labor income is (see (2.19))
t1 ≡ t−
es
1 + r
, es ≡ psd + (1− p) sa, (3.8)
where es denotes the expected second-period subsidy rate on first-period income. With
this definition of the first-period marginal tax rate, the overall impact of the policy reform
on the government budget (2.19) can be written as t1w[αdc1 + (1− α)dL1]. While (3.3)
ensures that the direct eﬀect on the budget is zero, (2.10) implies that second-period
labor supply remains constant because the tax rate t is unaﬀected. The government
budget thus improves if the first-period labor supply of both skill types increases (under
the assumption t1 > 0; sub-section 3.3 below shows that t1 is indeed typically positive in
the optimum). Given the relationship between dG and db implied by (3.3), labor supply
does in fact increase, because section A.2 of the appendix establishes that
p
1 + r
∂c1
∂G
− ∂c1
∂b
> 0 and
p
1 + r
∂L1
∂G
− ∂L1
∂b
> 0 for sd > sa. (3.9)
The improvement of the public budget resulting from the utility-preserving policy
reform (3.3) would enable the government to engineer a Pareto improvement (say, by
raisingG by more than implied by (3.3)). This shows that the starting point characterized
by full insurance of both skill groups cannot be a social optimum.
The intuition for this result is the following: by reducing disability insurance through
a cut in b, the government stimulates labor supply and thus expands the base of the la-
bor tax because agents can partly undo the worsening of disability insurance by working
harder in the first period if sd > sa — a condition that must be met in the initial equilib-
rium with full insurance. Given an initial equilibrium with full disability insurance, the
welfare loss from reduced insurance is only second order, whereas the expansion of the
labor income tax base generates a first-order welfare gain if t1 > 0. In other words, dis-
ability insurance should be less than perfect if the government also wants to insure against
skill heterogeneity through a positive labor income tax rate redistributing resources from
high-skilled to low-skilled agents.
The government thus faces an incentive to prevent private insurance companies from
fully insuring disability. This encourages individuals to self-insure through precautionary
individual saving and to improve their benefits from public disability insurance through
additional work eﬀort when young (if sd > sa). Although we do not model moral hazard
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in disability insurance, full insurance is thus not optimal. The reason is that private
insurance against disability generates a negative fiscal externality on the base of the
distortionary tax oﬀering insurance against skill heterogeneity. With endogenous labor
supply and lack of public information on individual work eﬀort, this public insurance of
skill heterogeneity does generate moral hazard.4
3.3. The optimal marginal tax rates
Expressions for the optimal (eﬀective) marginal income tax rates are derived in section
A.3 of the appendix. If the high-skilled are less than fully insured against disability, the
optimal marginal tax rate on second-period labor income is given by5
t
1− t =
(1− β2)
¡
1− αh2
¢
(1− α)
ε2
, (3.10)
β2 ≡
wc2
WL2
, ε2 ≡ αβ2ε2c + (1− α) ε2h, αh2 ≡
δ (1 + r)U 0ah
λ
+ t1W
µ
1 + r
1− p
¶
∂L1
∂B
.
The variable αh2 in (3.10) measures the marginal social valuation of second-period income
for an able high-skilled worker (accounting for the impact on the public budget through
the induced income eﬀect on labor supply). εc2 and ε
h
2 denote the wage elasticities of
second-period labor supply for the low-skilled and the high-skilled, respectively, so that
ε2 is a weighted elasticity of second-period labor supply. 1 − β2 measures the degree of
inequality in the distribution of second-period pre-tax labor income. The optimal value of
t depends only on variables relating to the second period. The reason is that first-period
labor supply is determined by bt1 rather than t. By varying sd and sa, the government can
manipulate bt1 independently from t (see (2.13) and (2.14)).
The optimal eﬀective marginal tax rate on first-period labor income (defined in (3.8))
is given by an analogous expression if both skill groups are less than fully insured against
4For the external eﬀects between insurers in the presence of moral hazard, see Pauly (1974) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
5The next sub-section shows that the conditions for both skill groups to be less than fully insured
in the optimum are weak. If the non-mimicking constraint for the high-skilled would nevertheless be
binding, we must define αh2 ≡
δ(1+r)U0ah
λ + t1W
³
1+r
1−p
´
∂L1
∂B +
µh
1−α
³
1+r
1−p
´ ¡
1−W (sd − sa)∂L1∂B
¢
, where
µh is the shadow price associated with the non-mimicking constraint for the high-skilled. All other
expressions are unaﬀected.
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disability:6
t1
1− t1
=
(1− β1)
¡
1− αh1
¢
(1− α)
εc1
, (3.11)
β1 ≡
wc1
WL1
, εc1 ≡ αβ1εc1c + (1− α) εc1h, αh1 ≡
U 01h
λ
+ t1W
∂L1
∂G
.
The inequality in the distribution of first-period labor income enters through the variable
β1. During the first period, both income and substitution eﬀects aﬀect labor supply.
Nevertheless, the optimal marginal tax rate depends only on substitution eﬀects, captured
by the weighted average (εc1) of the compensated skill-specific labor supply elasticities, ε
c
1c
and εc1h. The variable α
h
1 measures the marginal social evaluation of first-period income
for a high-skilled worker taking the tax-base eﬀect into account.
In the normal case, the government wishes to redistribute income so that αhi < 1,
i = 1, 2.7 (3.10) and (3.11) then imply that the optimal marginal tax rates are positive.
Moreover, ceteris paribus the elasticities and the marginal social evaluations, these opti-
mal tax rates increase with the degree of inequality in the distribution of pre-tax income.
Furthermore, a larger fraction of high-skilled workers in the labor force 1 − α broadens
the base for redistribution, making it worthwhile to impose a higher marginal tax rate.8
According to (3.10) and (3.11), the government typically wants to impose diﬀerent
marginal eﬀective tax rates on income in the two periods by choosing a non-zero value of
6As already mentioned, the next sub-section shows that the conditions are weak for both skill groups
to be less than fully insured in the optimum.
7Expressions (A.16) and (A.18) in the appendix imply that the marginal social evaluation averaged
over the low- and high-skilled is unity: α · αci + (1− α) · αhi = 1 (where αci is defined analogously as αhi :
αc1 ≡
U 01c
λ + t1w
∂c1
∂G and α
c
2 ≡
δ(1+r)U 0ac
λ + t1w
³
1+r
1−p
´
∂c1
∂B ).
8Although derived in an intertemporal context, the formulas (3.10) and (3.11) are closely related to
the formula for the optimal linear income tax obtained by Dixit and Sandmo (1977) for the case with
many skill groups in a one-period setting. In the Dixit-Sandmo world, the optimal marginal tax rate on
labor income is given by
t
1− t = −
cov
£
αi, wiLi
¤
E (wiLiεci )
where cov
£
αi, wiLi
¤
is the covariance between the marginal social evaluation of income for skill group i
(accounting for the impact on the public budget via the induced income eﬀect on labor supply) and the
pre-tax labor income wiLi of that skill group, and E
¡
wiLiεci
¢
is the income-weighted average compen-
sated labor supply elasticity across skill groups. In fact, (3.10) and (3.11) can be written in this form by
using expressions (A.16) and (A.18) in the Appendix, which imply that the marginal social evaluation
averaged over the low- and high-skilled is unity (see the previous footnote).
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the average subsidy rate es (since t1 ≡ t− ?s1+r , while β1, αh1 and εc1 generally diﬀer from
β2, α
h
2 and ε2). Ceteris paribus βi and α
h
i ; i = 1, 2, if the labor supply of older workers
is more wage elastic than that of younger workers (i.e ε2 > ε1), eﬃciency considerations
cause the optimal t to be below the optimal t1. Ceteris paribus the elasticities and the
marginal social evaluations, αhi , distributional considerations reinforce this tendency if
first-period labor income is more unequally distributed than second-period labor income
(i.e. β1 < β2).
3.4. The optimal level of social insurance
The previous sub-section assumed that neither the low-skilled nor the high-skilled were
fully insured. This sub-section states the conditions under which imperfect insurance
of both skill groups is indeed optimal. Section A.4 in the appendix employs the first-
order conditions for the solution to the optimal tax problem to derive expressions for the
marginal utility diﬀerentials U 0dc −U 0ac and U 0dh −U 0ah, assuming that no skill group faces
a binding non-mimicking constraint, i.e., that no group is fully insured. If the resulting
expressions are positive, this validates the initial assumption of imperfect insurance.
For the low-skilled group, the assumption that no group faces a binding non-mimicking
constraint gives rise to (see section A.4 of the appendix)
U 0dc−U 0ac =
¡
sd − sa
¢µλt1
Ψ
¶½
(1− β1)wΩc +
µ
λt1
1− t1
¶µ
εc1h
U 01h
¶ ∙
wΩc +
µ
1− α
α
¶
WΩh
¸¾
,
(3.12)
Ψ ≡ 1− β1 +
µ
λt1
1− t1
¶µ
εc1h
U 01h
− β1ε
c
1c
U 01c
¶
,
where Ωc and Ωh are positive magnitudes that depend on the properties of the utility
function (see eq. (A.37) in the appendix). Sub-section 3.1 demonstrated that the optimal
policy involves sd > sa. The expression on the right-hand side of (3.12) is therefore
positive if Ψ is positive. In view of the definition of Ψ, the conditions on εc1h and ε
c
1c for
this to be the case are very weak, since β1 < 1 and U
0
1c > U
0
1h. Accordingly, the low-skilled
are imperfectly insured against disability as long as t1 > 0. Redistributive taxation thus
makes imperfect disability insurance optimal.
For high-skilled workers, the assumption that no skill group faces a binding non-
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mimicking constraint implies that (see section A.4 of the appendix)
U 0dh−U 0ah =
¡
sd − sa
¢µλt1
Ψ
¶½
(1− β1)WΩh −
µ
λt1
1− t1
¶µ
β1ε
c
1c
U 01c
¶ ∙µ
α
1− α
¶
wΩc +WΩh
¸¾
.
(3.13)
Inserting (3.11) into (3.13) to eliminate t1
1−t1 , we obtain
U 0dh−U 0ah =
¡
sd − sa
¢µλt1
Ψ
¶
(1− β1)
½
WΩh −
¡
1− αh1
¢µβ1λεc1c
U 01cε
c
1
¶£
αwΩc + (1− α)WΩh
¤¾
.
(3.14)
The conditions for the right-hand side of (3.14) to be positive are weak, since W > w,
1−αh1 ≤ 1, and U 01c/λ > 1 (if ∂L1∂G ≈ 0). In particular, the condition is met if Ωc does not
greatly exceed Ωh (implying that imperfect insurance of the low-skilled does not provide
much stronger incentives than imperfect insurance of the high-skilled) and inequality is
high so that β1 is small. Intuitively, high inequality drives up the marginal tax rate, thus
distorting labor supply. To oﬀset this distortion, the government finds it optimal to oﬀer
only imperfect disability insurance to skilled agents in order to induce these agents to
work harder in the first period so as to obtain better disability insurance in the second
period. Indeed, equations (3.12) and (3.13) show that full disability insurance is optimal
if the government does not employ distortionary taxes to redistribute across skills (i.e. if
t1 = 0 because β1 = 1, α
h
1 = 1, or α = 1). Hence, disability insurance is imperfect to the
extent that it helps to alleviate the labor-market distortions imposed by redistributive
taxation. In the absence of these distortions, the government would structure its public
transfers so as to provide full disability insurance to both skills.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper studied optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy
where public policy insures (from behind the ’veil of ignorance’) both skill heterogeneity
and exogenous disability risk. Although the government has at its disposal suﬃcient
policy instruments to insure both skill groups fully against disability, and even though
moral hazard in disability is absent, full disability insurance is not optimal. Instead, by
oﬀering imperfect insurance and structuring disability benefits so as to enable workers to
improve their insurance against disability by working harder, the government can allevi-
ate the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax. Specifically, optimal
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disability insurance should allow disability benefits to vary positively with previous earn-
ings. Hence, the eﬀective marginal tax rate depends on the taxpayer’s lifetime earnings
capacity, and redistribution is based on lifetime incomes. Lifetime taxation improves the
trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives. It provides better disability insurance for
the high-skilled and enhances their incentives to supply labor, thereby alleviating the
labor-market distortions imposed by redistributive taxation.
To allow a detailed characterization of the optimal tax and subsidy rates, we have
restricted the analysis to a linear tax-transfer system with certain non-linear elements.
We did not study the potential second-best role of capital income taxation in the overall
tax-transfer system. Since precautionary saving allows people to partly insure against
shocks to their human capital, the government may choose to distort saving. In future
work we plan to extend the analysis to a fully non-linear tax system that also allows for
capital income taxation distorting saving behavior.
19
Technical Appendix
This appendix derives the eﬀects of the various policy instruments on individual labor
supply and the first-order conditions for the solution to the optimal tax problem. We
then use these relationships to prove some results reported in the main text.
A.1. The eﬀects of taxes and transfers on labor supply
We consider the labor supply of the low-skilled group; the labor supply of high-skilled
workers is characterized by completely analogous expressions. For convenience, we drop
the subscript c in terms involving derivatives of the utility function. To find the elasticities
of first-period labor supply and saving with respect to the policy variables, we totally
diﬀerentiate (2.11) and (2.12) to arrive at
⎛
⎝ −a1G − (1 + r)(a1b + a1B) −a1Gs¯
cw − a1bsdw − a1Bsaw
−a2G − (1 + r)(a2b + a2B) −g00(c1)U
0
1 − a2Gs¯cw − a2bsdw − a2Bsaw
⎞
⎠×
⎛
⎝ dS
dc1
⎞
⎠
=
⎛
⎝ ∆
S
∆c
⎞
⎠ , (A.1)
where
∆S ≡ −a1GdG+ a1bdb+ a1BdB + (a1Gwc1 − a1Bwc2)dt+ a1bwc1dsd + a1Bwc1dsa,
∆L ≡ −a2GdG+ a2bdb+ a2BdB + (wU 01 + a2Gwc1 − a2Bwc2)dt
+(a2bwc1 − δwpU 0d)dsd + (a2Bwc1 − δw(1− p)U 0a)dsa,
s¯c ≡ pˆ
csd + (1− pˆc)sa
1 + r
, a1G ≡ −U 001 , a2G = −s¯wU 001 ,
a1b ≡ −δ(1 + r)p [pU 00d + (1− p)U 00da] , a2b ≡ −δwp
£
psdU 00d + (1− p)saU 00da
¤
,
a1B ≡ −δ(1 + r)(1− p) [pU 00da + (1− p)U 00a ] , a2B ≡ −δw(1− p)
£
psdU 00da + (1− p)saU 00a
¤
.
Applying Cramer’s Rule to the system (A.1), we can find the various labor-supply
eﬀects from the system
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⎛
⎝ dS
dc1
⎞
⎠
=
1
∆
⎛
⎝ −g
00(c1)U
0
1 − a2Gs¯cw − a2bsdw − a2Bsaw a1Gs¯cw + a1bsdw + a1Bsaw
a2G + (1 + r)(a2b + a2B) −a1G − (1 + r)(a1b + a1B)
⎞
⎠
×
⎛
⎝ ∆
S
∆c
⎞
⎠ (A.2)
where the determinant∆ of the Jacobian is positive because of the second-order condition
for individual optimization.
From this solution, we find
∂c1
∂t
=
∂cc1
∂t
− wc1
∂c1
∂G
− wc2
∂c1
∂B
∂c1
∂sd
=
∂cc1
∂sd
+ wc1
∂c1
∂b
(A.3)
∂c1
∂sa
=
∂cc1
∂sa
+ wc1
∂c1
∂B
(A.4)
∂cc1
∂t
= −wU
0
1[a1G + (1 + r)(a1b + a1B)]
∆
(A.5)
∂cc1
∂sd
=
δwpU 0d[a1G + (1 + r)(a1b + a1B)]
∆
= −δpU
0
d
U 01
∂cc1
∂t
= − pˆ
c
1 + r
∂cc1
∂t
, (A.6)
where the last equality follows by substituting (2.11) to eliminate U 01 and using (2.15).
Similarly, we find
∂cc1
∂sa
=
δw(1− p)U 0a[a1G + (1 + r)(a1b + a1B)]
∆
= −δ(1− p)U
0
a
U 01
∂cc1
∂t
= −1− pˆ
c
1 + r
∂cc1
∂t
, (A.7)
while the various income eﬀects are given by
∂c1
∂G
=
(1 + r)[a2G(a1b + a1B)− a1G(a2b + a2B)]
∆
, (A.8)
∂c1
∂b
=
a2Ga1b − a1Ga2b + (1 + r)[a2Ba1b − a1Ba2b]
∆
, (A.9)
∂c1
∂B
=
a2Ga1B − a1Ga2B − (1 + r)[a2Ba1b − a1Ba2b]
∆
, (A.10)
so that
∂c1
∂G
= (1 + r)
µ
∂c1
∂b
+
∂c1
∂B
¶
. (A.11)
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Note that with s = sa = sd (so that first-period labor supply does not act as insur-
ance against disability), we have a2i = sw(1+r)a1i, i = G, b,B and thus
∂c1
∂G =
∂c1
∂b =
∂c1
∂B = 0.
Intuitively, saving rather than labor supply is adjusted to reallocate consumption in-
tertemporally. This is also the intuition behind (A.11): if the consumer receives addi-
tional lump-sum income in both states in the second period (i.e. db = dB > 0), she will
respond in the same way as if that income comes in the first period (discounted properly
with 1 + r so that dG = db
1+r =
dB
1+r). The consumer will simply undo reallocation of
lump-sum income dG = − db
1+r = −
dB
1+r over the life cycle through saving behavior as long
as the generational account is not aﬀected.
By substituting the definitions of aij into the solutions for the income eﬀects on labor
supply, we find:
∂c1
∂b
= −δw(s
d − sa)p2(1− p)
∆
⎧
⎨
⎩
a1G
U 0aU 0d
(pU 0d+(1−p)U
0
a)
³
U 00da
U 0a
− U
00
d
U 0d
´
+
δ(1 + r)2(1− p) [U 00aU 00d − (U 00da)2]
⎫
⎬
⎭ (A.12)
∂c1
∂B
=
δw(sd − sa)p(1− p)2
∆
⎧
⎨
⎩
a1G
U 0aU 0d
(pU 0d+(1−p)U
0
a)
³
U 00da
U 0d
− U 00aU 0a
´
+
δ(1 + r)2p [U 00aU
00
d − (U 00da)2]
⎫
⎬
⎭ (A.13)
∂c1
∂G
= (1 + r)
µ
dc1
db
+
dc1
dB
¶
=
δ(1 + r)w(sd − sa)
∆
a1Gp(1− p)U 0aU 0d¡
pU 0d + (1− p)U
0
a
¢
×
½
pU 00d
U 0d
− (1− p)U
00
a
U 0a
− U 00da[
p
U 0a
− (1− p)
U 0d
]
¾
(A.14)
From (2.2) through (2.6) one can show that
U 00da
U 0a
− U
00
d
U 0d
= −
u00
¡
Cd2c
¢
pu0
¡
Cd2c
¢ > 0 and U 00da
U 0d
− U
00
a
U 0a
= − u
00 (Ca2c − h (c2))
(1− p)u0 (Ca2c − h (c2))
> 0.
Moreover, concavity of the utility function implies that U 00aU
00
d−(U 00da)2 > 0. It then follows
from (A.12) that a higher transfer to the disabled (b) reduces labor supply if sd > sa.
Intuitively, labor supply helps to insure disability if sd > sa. In that case, more insurance
through a higher b makes labor supply less attractive. Similarly, a higher transfer to the
able (B) implies that disability is less well insured, and according to (A.13) labor supply
therefore increases to better insure disability (if sd > sa so that labor supply helps to
insure disability). Note that there are two terms in the expressions for dc1db and
dc1
dB . The
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term including a1G depends on intertemporal substitution (and also on risk aversion),
while the other term (including U 00aU
00
d − (U 00da)2) depends only on risk aversion. With
higher b, the consumer wants to spread the welfare gain to the able state if risk aversion
is positive (this is the term with U 00aU
00
d − (U 00da)2) and to the first period (via increased
first-period consumption of leisure as well as material goods) if intertemporal substitution
is finite. The latter eﬀect is captured by the term with a1G, which is positive only if
risk aversion is correspondingly positive; otherwise, the consumer can better reallocate
resources to the first period through dissaving rather than by lowering first-period labor
supply.
A higher first-period transfer G depresses first-period labor supply if higher income
boosts utility (especially in the disabled state (U 0d > U
0
a)) and consumption in the two
states are complements (i.e. U 00da > 0 because risk aversion exceeds the inverse of intertem-
poral substitution), and the intertemporal substitution elasticity is finite (i.e., a1G > 0). If
U 00da=0, a higher transfer may actually raise first-period labor supply if additional second-
period income especially leads to a rapid fall in utility in ability (i.e., (−U 00a ) is large
compared to (−U 00d )) so that it becomes attractive to reallocate income to the disabled
state. Note that the sign of the income eﬀect on labor supply is diﬀerent from normal.
This is because labor supply has an insurance function.
A.2. The suboptimality of full insurance
We may now derive the result stated in eq. (3.9) which was used to demonstrate that
full insurance of both skill groups cannot be optimal. From (A.12) through (A.14), we
have
p
1 + r
∂c1
∂G
− ∂c1
∂b
= p
∂c1
∂B
− (1− p)∂c1
∂b
=
δw(sd − sa)p2(1− p)2
∆
½
a1GU
0
aU
0
dX
c
pU 0d + (1− p)U
0
a
+ δ(1 + r)2
£
U 00aU
00
d − (U 00da)2
¤¾
, (A.15)
Xc ≡ U
00
da
U 0d
+
U 00da
U 0a
− U
00
d
U 0d
− U
00
a
U 0a
.
Using the definitions in (2.2) through (2.6), we find that
Xc = −
"
u00 (Ca2c − h (c2))
(1− p)u0 (Ca2c − h (c2))
+
u00
¡
Cd2c
¢
pu0
¡
Cd2c
¢# > 0.
Since concavity of the utility function implies U 00aU
00
d − (U 00da)2 > 0, it then follows from
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(A.15) that p
1+r
∂c1
∂G −
∂c1
∂b > 0 for s
d > sa. A similar result holds for the high-skilled group,
as reported in (3.9).
A.3. The optimal labor income tax rates
The optimal tax problem is to maximize the social welfare function (2.22), subject
to the constraints (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). Using (2.17) and (2.18) together with the
results (A.3) through (A.7), we may write the first-order conditions for the solution to
this problem as follows (where the subscript c (h) refers to the low-skilled (high-skilled),
the superscript c indicates a compensated labor supply response, and λ, µc, and µh are the
shadow prices associated with the government budget constraint and the non-mimicking
constraints for the low-skilled and the high-skilled, respectively (note that second-period
labor supply is not aﬀected by income eﬀects)):9
G: αU 01c + (1− α)U 01h + λt1
∙
αw
∂c1
∂G
+ (1− α)W ∂L1
∂G
¸
= λ+ µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂c1
∂G
+ µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂G
, (A.16)
b : δp [αU 0dc + (1− α)U 0dh] + λt1
∙
αw
∂c1
∂b
+ (1− α)W ∂L1
∂b
¸
=
pλ
1 + r
+ µc
∙
1 + w
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂c1
∂b
¸
+ µh
∙
1 +W
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂b
¸
, (A.17)
B: δ (1− p) [αU 0ac + (1− α)U 0ah] + λt1
∙
αw
∂c1
∂B
+ (1− α)W ∂L1
∂B
¸
=
(1− p)λ
1 + r
− µc
∙
1− w
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂c1
∂B
¸
− µh
∙
1−W
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂B
¸
, (A.18)
t: α [wc1U 01c + δwc2 (1− p)U 0ac] + (1− α) [WL1U 01h + δWL2 (1− p)U 0ah]
= λ
½
αwc1 + (1− α)WL1 +
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
[αwc2 + (1− α)WL2]
¾
+λα
∙
t1w
µ
∂cc1
∂t
− wc1
∂c1
∂G
− wc2
∂c1
∂B
¶
+ tw
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
∂c2
∂t
¸
9(A.16), (A.17) and (A.18) are not independent equations. To see this, add (A.17) and (A.18),
multiply the result by (1 + r), and use (A.11) and (2.11) to arrive at (A.16). The government thus has
only two independent lump-sum instruments.
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+λ (1− α)
∙
t1W
µ
∂Lc1
∂t
−WL1
∂L1
∂G
−WL2
∂L1
∂B
¶
+ tW
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
∂L2
∂t
¸
−µcwc2 − µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢µ∂cc1
∂t
− wc1
∂c1
∂G
− wc2
∂c1
∂B
¶
−µhWL2 − µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢µ∂Lc1
∂t
−WL1
∂L1
∂G
−WL2
∂L1
∂B
¶
, (A.19)
sd: δp [αwc1U 0dc + (1− α)WL1U 0dh] + λαt1w
∙
wc1
∂c1
∂b
−
µ bpc
1 + r
¶
∂cc1
∂t
¸
+λ (1− α) t1W
∙
WL1
∂L1
∂b
−
µ bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
¸
=
µ
pλ
1 + r
¶
[αwc1 + (1− α)WL1] + µcwc1 + µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∙
wc1
∂c1
∂b
−
µ bpc
1 + r
¶
∂cc1
∂t
¸
+µhWL1 + µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∙
WL1
∂L1
∂b
−
µ bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
¸
, (A.20)
sa: δ (1− p) [αwc1U 0ac + (1− α)WL1U 0ah] + λαt1w
∙
wc1
∂c1
∂B
−
µ
1− bpc
1 + r
¶
∂cc1
∂t
¸
+λ (1− α) t1W
∙
WL1
∂L1
∂B
−
µ
1− bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
¸
=
µ
(1− p)λ
1 + r
¶
[αwc1 + (1− α)WL1]−µcwc1+µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∙
wc1
∂c1
∂B
−
µ
1− bpc
1 + r
¶
∂cc1
∂t
¸
−µhWL1 + µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∙
WL1
∂L1
∂B
−
µ
1− bph
1 + r
¶
∂Lc1
∂t
¸
, (A.21)
where t1 is defined in (3.8). In addition to meeting these first-order conditions, the solu-
tion to the optimal tax problemmust also satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
µc ≥ 0, Zc ≥ 0, µcZc = 0, (A.22)
µh ≥ 0, Zh ≥ 0, µhZh = 0. (A.23)
To find the optimal marginal tax rate on second-period labor income (t), we start
by adding the first-order conditions (A.20) and (A.21), multiplying by 1 + r, and using
(A.11) and (2.11) (for both households) to obtain
αU 01cwc1 + (1− α)U 01hWL1 + λt1
∙
αw
∂c1
∂G
wc1 + (1− α)W
∂L1
∂G
WL1
¸
−λt1
∙
αw
∂cc1
∂t
+ (1− α)W ∂L
c
1
∂t
¸
= λ [αwc1 + (1− α)WL1]
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+µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
wc1
∂c1
∂G
− ∂c
c
1
∂t
¶
+ µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
WL1
∂L1
∂G
− ∂L
c
1
∂t
¶
. (A.24)
Now insert (A.24) into (A.19) to find
αwc2
∙
δ (1− p)U 0ac − λ
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
+ λt1w
∂c1
∂B
¸
+(1− α)WL2
∙
δ (1− p)U 0ah − λ
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
+ λt1W
∂L1
∂B
¸
= −λ
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶µ
t
1− t
¶£
αwc2ε
c
2 + (1− α)WL2εh2
¤
−µcwc2
∙
1− w
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂c1
∂B
¸
− µhWL2
∙
1−W
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂B
¸
, (A.25)
εc2 ≡
∂c2
∂w (1− t)
w (1− t)
c2
, εh2 ≡
∂L2
∂W (1− t)
W (1− t)
L2
.
Multiplying (A.18) by wc2, we obtain
αwc2
∙
δ (1− p)U 0ac − λ
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
+ λt1w
∂c1
∂B
¸
= − (1− α)wc2
∙
δ (1− p)U 0ah − λ
µ
1− p
1 + r
¶
+ λt1W
∂L1
∂B
¸
− wc2
¡
µc + µh
¢
+wc2
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
µcw
∂c1
∂B
+ µhW
∂L1
∂B
¶
. (A.26)
Substituting (A.26) into (A.25) to eliminate U 0ac, dividing through by
λWL2(1−α)(1−p)
1+r and
rearranging, we end up with
t
1− t =
(1− β2)
¡
1− αh2
¢
(1− α)
ε2
+
µ
µh (1 + r) (1− β2)
λ (1− p) ε2
¶ ∙
W
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂B
− 1
¸
,
(A.27)
where αh2 , β2 and ε2 are defined in eq. (3.10) in the main text.
Next we derive the optimal eﬀective marginal tax rate on first-period labor income
(t1). Multiplying (A.16) by wc1, we obtain
αwc1
µ
U 01c − λ+ λt1w
∂c1
∂G
¶
= − (1− α)wc1
µ
U 01h − λ+ λt1W
∂L1
∂G
¶
+wc1
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
µcw
∂c1
∂G
+ µhW
∂L1
∂G
¶
, (A.28)
while (A.24) implies
αwc1
µ
U 01c − λ+ λt1w
∂c1
∂G
¶
= λt1
∙
αw
∂cc1
∂t
+ (1− α)W ∂L
c
1
∂t
¸
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− (1− α)WL1
µ
U 01h − λ+ λt1W
∂L1
∂G
¶
+µcw
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
wc1
∂c1
∂G
− ∂c
c
1
∂t
¶
+ µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢µ
WL1
∂L1
∂G
− ∂L
c
1
∂t
¶
. (A.29)
Equating the right-hand sides of (A.28) and (A.29), using the facts (from the definition
of t1) that
∂cc1
∂t
=
∂cc1
∂t1
= −w ∂c
c
1
∂w (1− t1)
,
∂Lc1
∂t
=
∂Lc1
∂t1
= −W ∂L
c
1
∂W (1− t1)
, (A.30)
and dividing by WL1, we get
(1− β1) (1− α)
µ
U 01h − λ+ λt1W
∂L1
∂G
¶
= (1− β1)µhW
¡
sd − sa
¢ ∂L1
∂G
+
µ
sd − sa
1− t1
¶¡
µcβ1ε
c
1c + µ
hεc1h
¢
− λ
µ
t1
1− t1
¶
[αβ1ε
c
1c + (1− α) εc1h] , (A.31)
εc1c ≡
∂cc1
∂w (1− t1)
w (1− t1)
c1
, εc1h ≡
∂Lc1
∂W (1− t1)
W (1− t1)
L1
.
Dividing through by λ [αβ1ε
c
1c + (1− α) εc1h] in (A.31) and rearranging, we find
t1
1− t1
=
(1− β1)
¡
1− αh1
¢
(1− α)
εc1
+
µ
sd − sa
λεc1 (1− t1)
¶¡
µcβ1ε
c
1c + µ
hεc1h
¢
+
µhW (1− β1)
¡
sd − sa
¢
λεc1
∂L1
∂G
, (A.32)
where αh1 and ε
c
1 are defined in (3.11) in the main text. When none of the two non-
mimicking constraints are binding (that is, when it is optimal to oﬀer less than full
insurance to both skill groups), we have µc = µh = 0, and (A.27) and (A.32) then reduce
to eqs. (3.10) and (3.11) in the text, respectively.
A.4. The optimal level of social insurance
Finally, we derive the expressions for the optimal level of social insurance reported in
sub-section 3.4. To investigate the conditions under which the optimal insurance level is
less than perfect, we set µc = µh = 0. Dividing (A.20) by p and (A.21) by 1 − p, and
subtracting the latter equation from the former, we obtain
δαwc1 (U 0dc − U 0al) + δ (1− α)WL1 (U 0dh − U 0ah)
+λαwt1wc1
∙
1
p
∂c1
∂b
−
µ
1
1− p
¶
∂c1
∂B
¸
+ λ (1− α)Wt1WL1
∙
1
p
∂L1
∂b
−
µ
1
1− p
¶
∂L1
∂B
¸
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+
λαt1w
1 + r
∙
1− bpc
1− p −
bpc
p
¸
∂cc1
∂t
+
λ (1− α) t1W
1 + r
∙
1− bph
1− p −
bph
p
¸
∂Lc1
∂t
= 0. (A.33)
From (2.11) and (2.15), we have
bpi
p
=
δ (1 + r)U 0di
U 01i
,
1− bpi
1− p =
δ (1 + r)U 0ai
U 01i
, i = c, h. (A.34)
Inserting (A.34) into (A.33), dividing through by δWL1, and using (A.30), we may write
(A.33) as
α (U 0dc − U 0al) + (1− α) (U 0dh − U 0ah)− (1− β1)α (U 0dc − U 0al)
+λ
µ
t1
1− t1
¶ ∙
αβ1ε
c
1c
µ
U 0dc − U 0al
U 01c
¶
+ (1− α) εc1h
µ
U 0dh − U 0ah
U 01h
¶¸
=
λt1
δ
½
αwβ1
∙µ
1
1− p
¶
∂c1
∂B
− 1
p
∂c1
∂b
¸
+ (1− α)W
∙µ
1
1− p
¶
∂L1
∂B
− 1
p
∂L1
∂b
¸¾
. (A.35)
Dividing (A.17) by δp and (A.18) by δ (1− p) (recalling that µc = µh = 0) and subtracting
the latter equation from the former, we obtain
α (U 0dc − U 0al) + (1− α) (U 0dh − U 0ah)
=
λt1
δ
½
αw
∙µ
1
1− p
¶
∂c1
∂B
− 1
p
∂c1
∂b
¸
+ (1− α)W
∙µ
1
1− p
¶
∂L1
∂B
− 1
p
∂L1
∂b
¸¾
. (A.36)
Dividing through by p (1− p) in (A.15), we find thatµ
1
1− p
¶
∂c1
∂B
− 1
p
∂c1
∂b
= δ
¡
sd − sa
¢
Ωc, (A.37)
Ωc ≡ wp (1− p) (1 + r)
∆c
½
ac1GU
0
acU
0
dcX
c
U 01c
+ (1 + r)
£
U 00acU
00
dc − (U 00dac)2
¤¾
> 0,
and similarly we haveµ
1
1− p
¶
∂L1
∂B
− 1
p
∂L1
∂b
= δ
¡
sd − sa
¢
Ωh, Ωh > 0, (A.38)
where Ωh is defined analogously to Ωc. Using (A.37) and (A.38), we can write (A.35) as
αβ1 (U
0
dc − U 0al)
∙
1 +
λεc1c
U 01c
µ
t1
1− t1
¶¸
+ (1− α) (U 0dh − U 0ah)
∙
1 +
λεc1h
U 01h
µ
t1
1− t1
¶¸
= λt1
¡
sd − sa
¢ £
αwβ1Ω
c + (1− α)WΩh
¤
, (A.39)
Using (A.37) and (A.38), we can write (A.36) as
α (U 0dc − U 0al) + (1− α) (U 0dh − U 0ah) = λt1
¡
sd − sa
¢ £
αwΩc + (1− α)WΩh
¤
. (A.40)
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Using (A.40) to eliminate (1− α) (U 0dh − U 0ah) from (A.39), and solving for U 0dc−U 0dh, we
arrive at eq. (3.12) in the main text. Alternatively, using (A.40) to eliminate α (U 0dc − U 0al)
from (A.39) and solving for U 0dh − U 0ah, we end up with eq. (3.13).
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